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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DOXEY-LAYTON COMPANY, a
corporation and LYARD McOONKIE
and ILENE McOONKIE, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
VENDETTA CLARK, HAROLD RALPHS,
TWILA JOHNSON, CECIL G. RALPHS,
RUBY POWELL, and DENOTE RALPHS,
being the heirs of the deceased,
WILLIAM A. RALPHS and BERTHA RALPHS,
his wife, and any unknown heirs of
the deceased, WILLIAM A. RALPHS and
BERTHA RALPHS, his wife, and DENNIE
RALPHS and CHEVRON OIL COMPANY, a
corporation,

Case No. 14097

Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs brought an action to quiet title to certain real property,
including the mineral rights, located in Duchesne County, Utah, and to have
a mineral lease agreement with Defendant, Chevron Oil Company terminated.
Defendant, Chevron Oil Company, sought to have the lease agreement upheld as
a subsisting lease, and Defendants, Ralphs, et al, raised a counterclaim
against Plaintiff alleging that Plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers for value
of the oil, gas, and mineral rights of the land in question and that Defendants,
Ralphs, et al, had a superior right to 75% of said minerals.
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DISPOSITION IN LCWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge,
without a jury and the Court held in favor of Defendants ordering that the
Warranty Deed of August 13, 1963, be reformed by reason of a scrivener's
mistake to show a reservation of 75% of the mineral rights, and that
Defendants1 counterclaim was not barred by the statutes of limitations. The
Court further held the mineral lease with Chevron Oil Company to be valid
and in full force and effect.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek a reversal of the trial Courts ruling,
and for an Order that the Warranty Deed of August 13, 1963, not be changed
or reformed at this time, that the title to the real property in question,
including all the mineral rights be quieted in Plaintiffs and further that
the mineral lease agreement with Defendant, Chevron Oil Company, be terminated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 7, 1962, William and Bertha Ralphs, as Sellers, entered
into a Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit #1) with Hank and Donna Swain,
as Buyers, involving certain real property in Duchesne County. Paragraph 2
of the contract further stated "together with an undivided 25% of oil, gas
and mineral rights but excepting therefrom a lease now in existence". (That
lease was terminated before the lease referred to herein as the Chevron Oil
Company Lease, and they are not one and the same lease).
On August 13, 1963, an amendment to Uniform Real Estate Contract
(Exhibit #2) was executed by William and Bertha Ralphs and K.C. Ranches, Inc.,
a corporation, wherein it was recited that K.C. Ranches had been assigned the
contract interest of Swains and that Paragraph 2 of the September 7, 1962,
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contract was being amended. There was no mention of reserving any mineral
rights.
Also on August 13, 1963, a Warranty Deed (Exhibit #3) was executed
by William and Bertha Ralphs conveying the fee title to the real property,
mentioned in the amendment to real estate contract, to K. C. Ranches, Inc.
Again no mention was made of reserving any mineral rights, but there was
added to the description "subject to general property taxes after September 7,
1962".

Both documents signed on August 13, 1963, were done in the presence

of Max E. Gardner, a real estate broker, who read the documents aloud to
William and Bertha Ralphs at the time of the execution, and who assured them
that they were all right, although Mr. Ralphs could have read them, (R-181)
and in fact took them or sent them to the bank at Roosevelt, Utah, to be
escrowed (R-182-183).

The Warranty Deed remained with the Bank in escrow

until the land was paid off by Plaintiffs who then had the Deed recorded on
May 15, 1970.
On September 23, 1965, William and Bertha Ralphs entered in an oil,
gas and mineral lease agreement (Exhibit #10), leasing 100% of the minerals
involved on said real property, to Defendant Chevron Oil Company with annual
payments of $200.00 per year payable to Lessor. William and Bertha Ralphs,
or their heirs, have received all these payments over the years and have not
paid or tendered any of said payments or portions thereof to K.C. Ranches,
or to Plaintiffs.
On November 8, 1971, William Ralphs signed an Affidavit which
declared that he had made an error in the Deed of August 13/ 1963, because
it did not reserve 75% of the minerals (Exhibit #13).
On May 27, 1972, William Ralphs deeded by Quit Claim Deed to
his heirs, Defendants in this action, 2/3rds (66 2/3%) of the mineral rights,
which he declared was all he owned, on a substantial part of the land involved
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in this proceeding (Exhibit #8).
On April 21, 1967, Chevron Oil Company by letter acknowledged their
awareness of the unrecorded Deed of August 13, 1963, in favor of K.C. Ranches,
and Doxey-Layton Company's interest therein, and that a hold was being placed
on the rental payments (Exhibit #9).
paying

However, Chevron Oil Company did continue

the rental payments to the Ralphs each year thereafter (R-37-38).
Doxey-Layton Company, a Utah corporation, had discovered in 1965

that Mary Bennett, one of their employees and bookkeepers, had without
Doxey-Layton Companyfs permission or authorization, used funds of the company
to acquire the assets and properties of K.C. Ranches, Inc., including the
property subject of this litigation, and Quit Claim Deeds and Assignments
were obtained from K.C. Ranches, Inc., Mary Bennett and Carl Bennett in order
to make partial restitution to Doxey-Layton Company (R-123). The assignment
(Exhibit #6) dated November 4, 1965, and recorded November 8, 1965, and the
two Quit Claim Deeds (Exhibits #4 and #5), dated December 20, 1965, and
recorded February 15, 1966, made no mention of reservation of mineral rights.
On May 15, 1970, Doxey-Layton Company conveyed to McConkies the
land in question but reserved some of the minerals (Exhibit #7 and #14).
Doxey-Layton Company had been under the impression that they had
all the mineral rights involved with the property until about the spring of
1970 or 1971 when conversation took place between some of the Defendants,
heirs of William and Bertha Ralphs and the Doxeys (R-58-183-184).
The tax records of Duchesne County show that the real property
taxes on the property involved herein were paid by Plaintiffs, K.C. Ranches, Inc.
or Archie Mangum frcm 1963 through 1973. Further, that no taxes for those
years were paid by Defendants nor by William and Bertha Ralphs on said property
(R-123-124).
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Bertha Ralphs died August 6, 1971, at age 81 and William Ralphs
died in January of 1973, at age 85 (R-57) and neither William nor Bertha
Ralphs filed any legal action seeking to reform the Deed of August 13, 1963.
On January 22, 1973, Plaintiff Doxey-Layton Company filed its
action to quiet title to the property involved in the Deed of August 13, 1963,
and in the allegations Plaintiff stated that Defendants "may claim seme right,
title and interest in and to 75% of the mineral rights" (R-2).
On February 20, 1973, Defendant, Chevron Oil Company, filed its
answer, crossclaim and counterclaim setting forth that William and Bertha
Ralphs had died prior to cenmencement of that action and that the heirs of
William and BertJia Ralphs as well as Lyard and Ilene McConkie should be ordered
to interplead their respective claims or interests (R-8).
Plaintiff, Doxey-Layton Company, then filed an amended Complaint
on April 11, 1973, to include the McConkies as Parties Plaintiffs, and pursuant
to stipulation of counsel (RIO, 27).
Then after Defendants Ralphs' answer, counterclaim and crossclaim
was filed on June 12, 1973, setting forth who the heirs of William and Bertha
Ralphs were, counsel for Plaintiffs filed a second amended Complaint on
June 19, 1973, setting forth the heirs (R-20).
The Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion to so amend on July 12, 1973
(R-32).
Also, Plaintiffs filed, on June 19, 1973, their Reply to Defendants'
Ralphs Counterclaim (which had only alleged that Plaintiffs were not bona
fide purchasers for value of the mineral rights (R-17,19).

Plaintiffs' Reply

set forth affirmative defenses to Defendants' Counterclaim, including the
statutes of limitations (R-24), and there has been no responsive pleading
by Defendants to the limitation of actions defense.
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Counsel for Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based
upon the pleadings and upon the written memorandums and argument submitted
(R-63,102).
18, 1975.

The Court denied the Motion, and the case was tried on March
In that trial the Parties stipulated essentially to the exhibits

and the facts as set forth herein (R-122-124).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS A MATTER OF LAW
THAT DEFENDANTS CLAIM OF MISTAKE AND REFORMATION OF THE
AUGUST 13, 1963 DEED WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, AND IN FURTHER FINDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF
ESTOPPEL IN PAIS WAS APPLICABLE The statute that seems most applicable in this case is the three
year Statute of Limitations as contained in 78-12-26 (3) Utah Code Annotated,
1953 as amended.

It states:

"Within three years: . . an action for relief on the
ground of fraud or mistake; but the cause of action in such
case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery
by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud
or mistake."
The stipulated facts show that Plaintiffs, through the Warranty
Deed of August 13, 1963, received all the fee title, including all the minerals, on the real property shown in said Deed.

This Warranty Deed was

prepared by William and Bertha Ralphs or their agents and signed by them
on the date it bears. K. C. Ranches, Inc., a corporation, was the Grantee,
and it subsequently conveyed by Quit Claim Deed all of the right title and
interest, including the mineral rights to Doxey-Layton Company, two years
later in 1965. Said Warranty Deed of August 13, 1963 was placed with the
bank in escrow by William Ralphs, and out of their control and possession.
Now, over 10 years later, the heirs of William and Bertha Ralphs
claim an error was made in not reserving the minerals in the original Warranty
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Deed, and further claim that Plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers for
value of the mineral rights.
Counsel for Plaintiffs submits that Defendants are barred by this
three year Statute of Limitations.
The real question here is when does the three year statute commence to run in this case, or in other words, when are the Ralphs charged
with the discovery of the alleged mistake?
The heirs of William and Bertha Ralphs seek to excuse the mistake,
if indeed it was, by the fact that William and Bertha Ralphs did not read,
themselves, the Warranty Deed and the Amendment to Uniform Real Estate Contract on August 13, 1963 before signing it.
Appellants argue that the law is clear that the failure to read the
documents being signed when the Ralphs themselves had the documents prepared,
were not deceived by the Grantee, and the knowledge of what they contained or
should have contained was easily accessible, it does not excuse one from such
alleged mistake.
In 13 Am Jur 2nd, Section 34, Page 525 the law is stated:
"Equity will not relieve one from the burden of a contract
entered into by reason of a mistake resulting from negligence
where the means of knowledge were easily accessible. This is
particularly true where the mistake was due to a person's
failure to read, or have read to him, the instrument he was
executing and there are no special circumstances excusing his
failure to make himself acquainted with the contents of the
instrument, such as a confidential relationship existing between
him and the other party, or the general reputation of the other
party."
Again in 17 Am Jur 2nd, Section 149 at Page 498, we read:
"Failure to read a contract before signing it will not, as
a rule, affect its binding force. Indeed, the Courts appear to
be unanimous in holding that a person who, having the capacity
and an opportunity to read a contract, is not mislead as to its
contents and who sustains no confidential relationship to the
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other party cannot avoid the contract on the ground of mistake
if he signs it without reading it, at least in the absence of
special circumstances excusing his failure to read it. It is
the duty of every contracting party to learn and knew its contents before he signs and delivers it, and if the contract is
plain and unequivocal in its terms, he is ordinarily bound
thereby. To permit a party, when sued on a written contract,
to admit that he signed it but to deny that it expresses the
agreement he made or to allow him to admit that he signed it
but did not read it or know its stipulations would absolutely
destroy the value of all contracts."
Our case here is even stronger on this point, for Max Gardner, Real
Estate Broker, friend and agent of William and Bertha Ralphs read aloud the
Warranty Deed and the Amendment to Contract to the Ralphs and gave them sane
assurances (R-189).
It is also anything but clear from the evidence and exhibits in this
case that there was in fact a mistake as to the mineral rights. The Warranty
Deed and Amendment to Contract (exhibits #2 and #3), and the Assignment and
Quit Claim Deeds from K. C. Ranches to Doxeys (exhibits #4, #5 and #6) would
indicate otherwise. Also the testimony of Defendants own witnesses, Mr.
Gardner and Mrs. Powell, that Doxeys understood that they had all the mineral
rights in the property as late as 1970 or 1971 (R-184; 195) would indicate
otherwise. Furthermore, the fact that William and Bertha Ralphs attempted to
convey 25% of the minerals to the Swains by contract in 1962, 100% of the same
minerals to K. C. Ranches, Inc. by Deed and Amended Contract in August, 1963
(and it is interesting to note that no assignment document of the Swain contract from Swains to K. C. Ranches was ever produced in the case), 100% of the
same minerals to Chevron Oil Company by lease in September, 1965 (exhibit #10),
and 66 2/3% of these same mineral rights to their heirs in May, 1972 (exhibit #8),
even after preparing an affidavit in 1971 wherein William Ralphs stated he had
75% of the minerals (exhibit #13), would lead one to believe that William and
Bertha Ralphs were never sure what they intended to convey or reserve in the
way of minerals. That is why the self serving, improper and hearsay testimony
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of Max Gardner, who the Ralphs were apparently relying on in this transaction
and as their agent could have some responsibility and obligation for damages
to Defendants, should have been stricken by the trial court, when he testified
what Mr. Bennett agreed to or understood (for K. C. Ranches, Inc.) relative
to the mineral rights (R-18, 185, 186).
We submit, also, that the Utah Case of McKellar v. McKellar, (1969)
23 UT. 2nd 106, 458 P. 2nd 867 stands for the proposition that the tijne of the
discovery of an alleged mistake on a one page Deed under the three year limitation statute, Section 78-12-26(3) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is at the date of
the Deed was executed.

The Court stated:

"The critical issue resolves around the time of discovery
of the mistake . . . "
The Court further comments:
"In this action, Plaintiffs have not alleged that there was
any conduct on the part of the Defendant or her husband wtiich
prevented the Grantors from ascertaining the contents of the
ueeci . . •
Then the Court sums up the case as follows:
"Although Plaintiffs have not pleaded the circumstances that
contributed to the alleged unawareness of the grantors at the
time when they executed the conveyance of 1947, the rule stated
by the court in Hjermstad v. Barkuloo is relevant:
'It is a general rule that a party will not be relieved,
either by a court of equity or a court of law, where he
executes an instrument without reading it, when he has it
in his hands and negligently fails to ascertain the contents
of it; the other party not being quilty of any deceit or
false representations as to its contents, by means of which
he is put off his guard.' "
The case at bar is very similar to the McKellar case, and William and
Bertha Ralphs knew, or indeed should have known, if there actually was a mistake
involved in the August 1963 Deed, of the relevant facts which a reasonable diligence or inquiry on their part would have revealed, thus the Defendants, as
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their heirs, should be estopped from claiming the three year statute has not
run.

(See also the Utah case of Auerbach v. Samuels, 10 UT. 2nd 152; 349 JP

2nd 1112,1116).
The Hjermstad v. Barkuloo (1954 Montana) 270 P 2nd 1112, case cited
in McKellar decision also held that the Grantor, who was a college graduate with
considerable business experience, was guilty of negligence when he failed to read
a Deed before signing it. This is similar to the negligence of Max Gardner, agent
for William and Bertha Ralphs, who had considerable business and real estate experience, in failing to note the absence of reservation of minerals in their
Deed, and after reading the same aloud to the Ralphs.
59 ALR 818, states it this way:
"It has been held that equity assists only the vigilant,
hence it will not relieve against mistakes, which ordinary
care would have prevented. Conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence are necessary to call a court of equity into
activity."
and again at Page 819 of 59 ALR:
"Where a mistake occurs through a party's own want of
ordinary care, by reason of which he sustains loss, he cannot rescind . ."
Now counsel for Defendants, Ralphs, argued at the trial that the time
of discovery of the mistake by Defendants, or William and Bertha Ralphs, must be
determined as of the date of recording of the August 13, 1963 Deed, which date
was May 15, 1970 (R-80,82) and he admits this to be the case by the recording
statutes, 57-1-6 and 57-3-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 and the cases supporting,
such as Smith v. Edwards, 81 UT. 244; 17 P 2nd 264, and Crcmpton v. Jenson,
78 UT. 55; 1 P 2nd 242).

By this reasoning Defendants are still barred by the

three year limitation statute, for they did not commence "an action" within the
three year period. Also, by this admission, Defendants should be charged with
notice and discovery by the recording of the Assignment and two Quit Claim Deeds
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on this same property from K. C. Ranches to Doxey-Layton Gompany by February
15, 1966 (R-123).
On June 12, 1973, more than three years following the discovery of
the mistake under any of the theories, Defendants filed "an action" in the
form of a Counterclaim against Plaintiffs, alleging that Plaintiffs were not
bona fide purchasers for value of the mineral rights (R-19), but not at any
time have Defendants pled to have the Deed of August 13, 1963 cancelled or
reformed nor did thay move the Court to amend their pleadings or to conform
to the evidence as required by the rules; nor did Defendants plead with particularity mistake or error.
Plaintiffs1 Complaint and Amended Complaints were solely for a suit
to quiet title to the property deeded to them, and an action by Defendants to
cancel or reform a deed (if they had so pleaded) could not be considered a part
of Plaintiffs' original or amended pleadings.
Section 78-12-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides:
"Civil actions can be commenced only within the periods
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action shall
have accrued."
A Counterclaim for cancellation or reformation of a Deed, would if
properly pleaded, be considered a new action, not just a defense. Furthermore,
if properly pleaded it may require a tender of restoration or return to status
quo before such a suit could be maintained. (See 13 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 43, Page
529).
51 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 76, Page 655 states:
"The ultimate purpose of a limitation law is to bar actions
rather than to suppress or deny matters of defense. Hence, as
a general rule, limitation statutes are not applicable to defenses but apply only where affirmative relief is sought."
At Sec. 78, Page 657 of 51 Am. Jur. 2nd, it further states:
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In the absence of a statute to the contrary, a demand
pleaded by way of a set off, counterclaim, or cross claim
is regarded as an affirmative action in most jurisdictions
and therefore, unlike a matter of pure defense, is subject
to the operation of the statute of limitations, and is unavailable if barred."
In the case of Mauian Hotel, Inc. v. Naui Pineapple Co. (1971
Hawaii Case) 481 P 2nd 310 the Court states:
"Counterclaims, as with all other claims, will relate
back only if they arose out of a situation previously described in timely pleadings."
Defendants1 Counterclaim if "an action" at all can only be considered
an affirmative new action for reformation of a deed (R-138) which could not
relate back to Plaintiffs1 Gomplaint, and certainly was not a compulsory counterclaim as found by the Trial Court.
See also Strong v. Strong, 22 Cal. 2nd 540; 140 P 2nd 386, and
Hblton v. Jackson, 184 Ky. 559; 212 S.W. 587)
The Trial Court also erred in holding that the doctrine of "Equitable
Estoppel", or "Estoppel in Pais" was applicable in this case, as a basis for
holding that the statutes of limitations were not a bar to Defendants1 Counterclaim (R-144).
In its Findings of Fact, the Trial Court stated (R-137):
"The doctrine of "Estoppel in Pais" is applicable inasmuch as the Defendants1 counsel was waiting for the Plaintiffs1
counsel to file a further Amended Complaint in the litigation
prior to the said Defendants filing their Answer and Counterclaim herein."
New counsel for Plaintiffs has set out step by step in the facts of
this Brief the record of the pleadings and the filing thereof, which we refer
the Court to for purposes of this argument, and said pleadings speak for themselves .
Counsel for Defendants did not raise the issue and doctrine of Equit-
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able Estoppel in his pleadings, but it was first raised in argument before the
Trial Judge. There was no evidence taken, no proof offered on the question, and
Plaintiffs1 counsel refused to stipulate to the statements made by counsel in his
argument as he could not agree with the same (R-206,207).
The law is clear that the doctrine cannot be applied in these circumstances.
In 28 Am. Jur. 2nd, Sec. 36, Page 642 it states:
". . .it is still the rule that estoppels must be certain
to every intent and are not to be taken or sustained by mere
argument or doubtful inference. No party ought to be precluded
from making out his case according to its truth unless by force
of sane positive principle of law. Hence, the doctrine of estoppel
in pais must be applied strictly and should not be enforced unless
substantiated in every particular. It will not be deemed to arise
from facts which are ambiguous and subject to more than one construction, and nothing can be supplied by mere intendment. The
acts, claims, or conduct relied on to estop must be plainly inconsistent with the right afterward set up and must clearly appear
to have been done or made by the party whcm it is sought to bind."
Again none of the essential elements or proof is present in this case
to apply this doctrine.
In 28 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 35, Page 640 all the elements required to be
proved are set forth:
"Broadly speaking, the essential elements of an equitable
estoppel or estoppel in pais, as related to the party to be
estopped, are: (1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is
calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise
than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently
attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the expectation, that such conduct will be acted upon by, or influence,
the other party or other persons; and (3) knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the real facts. And broadly speaking, as related to the party claiming the estoppel, the essential elements
are (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the
truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance, in good faith,
upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and
(3) action or inaction based thereon of such a character as to
change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel,
to his injury, detriment, or prejudice. Whether these elements
are present, and whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel should
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therefore be applied, in a particular case, depends, of
course, upon the facts and circumstances of that case, and
manifestly, there can be no equitable estoppel if any essential element thereof is lacking or is not satisfactorily
proved.
(See also 28 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 147, Page 826, on necessity of proof,
and the case of Barber v. Anderson, 73 UT. 357; 274 P. 136, as to the necessity
of a sufficient allegation and plea of an estoppel in pais).
Now, none of the essential elements are present in this case for the
Court to have applied the doctrine, and it was certainly error, in any event,
to hold an estoppel in pais was present to bar the running of the Statutes of
Limitations without the same having been pleaded or any evidence or proof taken
thereon.
Although the main argument in Appellants1 Brief has been on the three
year limitation statute, it is nevertheless the contention of Appellants that
the Cburt erred in not ruling as a matter of law that Defendants were barred
in asserting their Counterclaim by reason of the other statutes set out as a
defense by Plaintiffs in their Reply. These statutes include 78-12-5; 78-12-6;
78-12-23(2); 78-12-25(2); and 78-12-7 through 78-12-12 (involving adverse possession) and the Court is referred to counsel's argument on these matters as
set out in Plaintiffs1 Memorandum Brief filed with the Trial Court (R-63-71).
Furthermore it appears to counsel for Plaintiffs that if Defendants
claim that the bar of these Statutes of Limitations was tolled or otherwise
inapplicable, they must be required to plead and prove the same, and this they
have not done.
(See Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines Development Co. 72 UT. 137; 269
P. 147).
The Court, therefore, should have held as a matter of law that Defendants1 claim of mistake and reformation of the August 13, 1963 Deed was barred
by the Statutes of Limitations.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW BASED UPON IMPROPER AND HEARSAY EVIDENCE ALLOWED INTO
THE RECORD.
Paragraph 3 (R-133) of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact states that
on August 13/ 1963, between K. C. Ranches, Inc. and the Ralphs:
"It was mutually agreed that the only purpose of said amendment was to correct the aforesaid erroneous legal description."
Paragraph 10 (R-134) of the Findings states:
"The President of K. C. Ranches, Inc., namely Carl Bennett,
while in the presence of Max Gardner, did assure the Ralphs that
everytliing would remain the same as in the original contract including mineral rights, and that the only change that the parties
were making was to correct the erroneous legal description."
Paragraph 12 (R-134) of the Findings states:
"It was the specific intention of the Ralphs and of K. C.
Ranches, Inc. that the amendment to Uniform Real Estate Contract
and the Warranty Deed dated August 13, 1963, only correct the
erroneous legal description and not alter or change positions
between the Ralphs as sellers and K. C. Ranches, Inc. as purchasers,
relative to the ownership of mineral rights."
The Findings of the Trial Gourt, as mentioned in Paragraphs 8, 10 and
12 above quoted are based entirely upon improper or hearsay evidence at the
trial, over the objections of counsel for Plaintiffs, and should not have been
allowed.

It was upon their testimony that the Court must have determined there

was a scrivener's mistake in the Warranty Deed of August 13, 1963, for the documents themselves do not show the intention of the parties to have mistakenly
left out a reservation of mineral rights.
The only evidence in the record of any conversations, understandings
or agreements between the deceased persons, William and Bertha Ralphs, and K.C.
Ranches, Inc., who was never served or brought in as a party to the action, was
the testijnony of Max Gardner (R-178-191).

It was Max Gardner, who was the

personal friend and Real Estate Broker of William and Bertha Ralphs, and who
may have some personal liability or responsibility to Defendants in his handling
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of the transaction and assurances given in 1963 (R-189).

His testimony, at

best, must be colored and self serving. There was no other corroborating testimony by any other witnesses.
Counsel for Plaintiffs had a standing objection before the Court on
hearsay evidence (R-176), and again counsel sought to have Max Gardner's testimony stricken on these hearsay conversations, (R-185) and that there was no way of
exaraining the absent and deceased parties of what was in their minds, what, they
knew or whether they had even read the agreements (R-186).

The Court, however,

denied Plaintiffs1 motions and objections.
Max Gardner testified at Page 181 of the record:
"Q. (By Mr. Mangan) All Right. Now at that time was there
a conversation relative to why this Amendment had to be signed?"
"A. We discussed this there, and Mr. Bennett agreed that
what he was getting was the approximate number of acres. The
only thing that was being changed was the legal description that
was in error, that everything else would be the same on the contract as the contract stated, including the mineral rights."
Again at Page 190 of the record, Max Gardner testified:
"Q. And did Mr. Bennett understand that when he was there?"
(Referring to the mineral rights)
"A.

Yes, he certainly did."

What was agreed to and understood by Mr, Bennett, or whether he was
speaking, agreeing or understanding for K. C. Ranches, Inc. was a matter of
conjecture and was improper and hearsay testimony, and the documents speak for
themselves.
The Court, however, seemed to allow this testimony on the basis that
Plaintiffs stood in the shoes of K. C. Ranches, Inc. The Court stated at page
176 of the record:
"Well, I'm going to, Mr. Young, I'm going to permit that
evidence, and if it's not proper evidence, I'll . . . you can
make a motion to strike at the conclusion of the whole thing.
You won't have to make your motion to strike each time and so
on. But I'm doing it on the theory that Doxey-Layton stands
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exactly the same shoes as K. C. Ranches and that if the K. C.
Ranches were a party to this action that that evidence would
be admissible. If we are wrong about that, that's something
that somebody else can do scmething about."
Under the "Rules of Evidence" as adopted by the Utah Supreme Court,
July 1, 1971, Rule 63 covers hearsay evidence as follows:
"Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a
witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the
truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence and inadmissible
except:"
Therefore, the statements testified to by Max Gardner of Mr. Bennett's
thoughts, agreements or understandings or of William and Bertha Ralphs1, was
clearly hearsay unless it can be brought within any of the exceptions of the
rule.

None of the exceptions seem to apply, however. As to Doxey-Layton Gom-

pany being in the same shoes as K. C. Ranches and treating Plaintiffs as though
K. C. Ranches, Inc. was a party, we fail to see the reasoning behind this.
Doxey-Layton Company was just one of the Plaintiffs in the action, and there
was certainly no agency or representative capacity existing between any of
the Plaintiffs and K. C. Ranches, Inc. or Mr. and Mrs. Carl Bennett. Doxeys
had become unwilling purchasers of the property throught the wrongful conduct
of Mrs. Bennett, and whether Carl Bennett properly represented K. C. Ranches
Corporation is questionable. Mary Bennett even signed as guardian of Carl
Bennett on the Deed of December 20, 1965, (Exhibit #5).

So to allow statements

of a person not a party, and whose association with the corporation is questionable,
and without the right and opportunity to cross examine as to the corporate understanding or agreement (beyond the writing or document) is improper and wrong.
Without this improper and hearsay evidence of Max Gardner, there is
really nothing in the record to substantiate a mistake, or that it was in fact
the intention of William and Bertha Ralphs to reserve the minerals in their
Deed to K. C. Ranches of August 13, 1963. Since William and Bertha Ralphs had
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conveyed away different amounts of the same mineral rights to different parties
on at least four separate occasions, previously mentioned herein (page 8), and
since William Ralphs was about 83 years of age when he signed the Affidavit
prepared for him in 1971, and since neither William or Bertha Ralphs ever
attempted, themselves, to file a claim in reference to the said mineral rights,
there is no clear intention shown, and the Trial Court should have upheld the
Deed of August 13, 1963 in view of the 10 year period of time that elapsed.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE CHEVRON OIL
COMPANY LEASE MAY BE TERMINATED BY PLAINTIFFS.
William and Bertha

Ralphs conveyed all the fee title, including oil

and gas and minerals to K. C. Ranches, Inc. on August 13, 1963, which title
subsequently was acquired by Plaintiffs. Although the August 13, 1963 Deed was
placed in escrow and out of the control of the Ralphs, it was not recorded until
May 15, 1970. However, K. C. Ranches, Inc. took possession of the land involved
in the Deed in August, 1963 and Doxeys acquired possession in the Fall of 1965.
On September 23, 1965, more than two years following the execution of
the Warranty Deed to K. C. Ranches, Inc., William and Bertha Ralphs entered into
an oil, gas and mineral lease (Exhibit #10), with Defendant Chevron Oil Company.
Said lease granted rights in favor of Chevron Oil to the lands already conveyed
to K. C. Ranches, and it involved 100% of the minerals for a 10 year period, with
$200.00 per year rental payments going to the Ralphs.
Although Chevron Oil Company may have checked the recorded records of
ownership, they must not have checked out the actual possessors of the land when
they entered into the lease agreement with the Ralphs.
It is therefore Appellants1 contention that they are the fee owners of
the land in question including all the oil, gas and mineral rights, and that
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inasmuch as no lease agreement exists between them and Chevron Oil Company, the
Appellants have a right to terminate or void the lease involving said minerals
and have title quieted in than.
We submit that the law is clear that the landowner is entitled to the
surface and all that is below it, and when there is no reservation of mineral
rights in a Deed, (as in Ralphs Deed to K. C. Ranches and to Plaintiffs) , everything is conveyed.

So when William and Bertha Ralphs leased minerals, oil and

gas rights, to Chevron Oil Company two years after their Deed to K. C. Ranches,
There was nothing to lease or convey.

(See 38 Am.Jur. 2nd Sec. 14, pages 493-

495; also Re Hart's Estate 151 Cal. App. 2nd 171; 311 P 2nd 605)
38 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 16, page 496 states as follows:
"To make an absolute conveyance of seme or all of his
interests in land, the landowner, may, of course, use a Deed.
A conveyance of land without any restrictions, limitations,
exceptions, or reservations would include all minerals and
mineral rights."
Counsel for Defendant, Chevron Oil Company, agrues in his memorandum
to the Trial Court (R-116-121) that paragraph 7 of the lease agreement (Exhibit
#10) allows the oil company to make its lease payments per the agreement, unless
certified copies of the recorded instruments showing the interest or title to be
elsewhere, are received by the company, and than counsel cites several cases.
Said paragraph 7 of the lease and the cases referred to only go to the question
of assignment or change in ownership by the Lessor after the lease is entered
into, not before.
In our particular case Ralphs had conveyed away their ownership two
years prior to executing the lease with Chevron Oil Company. Therefore, when
Chevron Oil received actual notice of the unrecorded Deed of August 13, 1963 as
shown by their admission and letter of April 21, 1967 (Exhibit #9), about four
years prior to their obtaining a small producing well in the area, we submit
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that said Defendant could not just ignore the fact and say they were not on
notice of Plaintiffs1 title. Also, Defendant, Chevron Oil Company, by their
letter of April 21, 1967 to Doxey-Layton Co. and Mr. Archie Mangum (who was on
the property at the tine), stated that they were placing "a hold" on the rental
payments pending a furnishing of the recording information, yet Chevron Oil
continued to make the lease payments to the Ralphs, and none of these payments,
or any portion thereof, have been paid or tendered to Plaintiffs or to K. C.
Ranches, Inc.
For these reasons it appears that Chevron Oil Company and the Ralphs
have not acted in good faith, as affecting Plaintiffs1 rights surrounding the
oil and gas and minerals here, and Plaintiffs should be entitled to have the lease
voided or terminated and title quieted in said Plaintiffs.

If it were otherwise,

Defendant, Chevron Oil Company, could, under the terms of the lease, go on indefinitely, and without rental payments, so long as they produced even a very small
amount from the well drilled.( See Exhibit #10, paragraph 2)
38 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 20, Page 501 we read:
"Generally, for a purchaser of interests relating to gas and
oil to be protected against claims based upon unrecorded transfers
he must have acted in good faith and without either actual or constructive notice. Thus, a person who purchases or leases land in
the face of information indicating that the transferor's title is
imperfect or that the land or an interest therein has already been
transferred to a third person, cannot be said to be an innocent
purchaser or lessor; consequently, the courts will not accord him
the rights of such an innocent person."
Chevron Oil Company may have entered into their lease with William and
Bertha Ralphs in good faith in 1965 by reason of the record title, but when they
received actual notice and a copy of the unrecorded Deed of August 13, 1963,
showing that Ralphs had no mineral interest to convey or lease to them, then
Chevron Oil either acted in bad faith by continuing lease payments to the Ralphs
and taking a chance to put a producing well on the property four years later, or
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they must have contacted Ralphs about the Deed of 1963 and gotten from them
their alleged claim of mistake or error.

In either event, when Chevron Oil

Company had actual notice in April, 1967, they were not hurt except for perhaps
one or two lease payments, which Plaintiffs are not asking for. Counsel for
Plaintiffs therefore submits that Chevron Oil cannot now claim an indefinite
valid and subsisting lease, as affecting Plaintiff, by reason of the small producing well, or by reason of estoppel or the recording statutes, after having
ignored the facts and the notice given them. Appellants should therefore be
entitled to void or terminate the lease entered into.

CONCLUSION

When William and Bertha Ralphs executed the Warranty Deed of August
13, 1963 without limitation or reservation of mineral rights, after having the
Deed read to then as to its correctness, and having failed to bring any action
for mistake or reformation or cancellation of said Deed for over 10 years, the
heirs of said William and Bertha Ralphs should be barred by reason of the Statutes
of Limitations from now changing the Deed, and the lease agreement entered into
by the said Ralphs with Chevron Oil Company regarding 100% of the oil, gas and
mineral rights, should be allowed to be voided or terminated by Plaintiffs.
The decision of the Trial Court with respect to these matters should
therefore be reversed and the title to the property, including the mineral rights,
should be quieted in Appellants.
Respectfully submitted,

GAYLEN S. YOUNG, JR.
Attorney for Plaitiffs-Appellants
2188 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah
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